Prescription drug plan (PDP) providers for the new Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit submitted their formularies to regulators at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to meet a June 6, 2005, deadline. These providers had spent months optimizing the structure of their formularies, but after the deadline CMS notified a number of plans that their formularies were not comprehensive enough. A CMS clarification stated that ''all or substantially all of the drugs in the antidepressant, antipsychotic, anticonvulsant, anticancer, immunosuppressant and HIV/AIDS categories'' must be covered by all formularies. 1 These plans had less than a week to submit new formularies meeting these requirements. One former Medicare official was quoted in the New York Times in June 2005 saying: ''Medicare officials are flexing their muscles. They are requiring prescription drug plans to cover more drugs than anyone expected. They are establishing a gold standard for access to drugs in a number of therapeutic classes'' (Pear 2005) .
Even the formulary of Kaiser Permanente's plan-cited as a model of best practice for the Medicare benefit by Bush administration officials in December 2004-was unacceptable. Kaiser's commercial formulary included only two brand names for many therapeutic classes. Offering such a limited formulary allows large drug purchasers to negotiate substantial discounts by using formulary placement as leverage over pharmaceutical companies (Frank 2001) . 2 As all formularies are required to cover more drugs, PDP providers will be less able to control drug costs.
Why did CMS require formularies to be more extensive than the existing best practice? One reason, we argue, is that a limited formulary will tend to harm Medicare beneficiaries to a much greater extent than the same formulary in an integrated plan like Kaiser's. The extent to which formulary restrictions harm beneficiaries depends crucially on how they are combined with other plan practices. A limited formulary works well for patients enrolled in Kaiser's managed care plan because Kaiser doctors usually prescribe from the formulary. Furthermore, a seamless process for exceptions ensures that medically necessary drugs are covered, even when they are not on the formulary. Since Medicare Part D is a stand-alone benefit, PDPs may not be able to achieve as high a formulary compliance nor have as much of an incentive to provide such a seamless exceptions process. This by itself does not explain why CMS intervention was needed. After all, the Medicare benefit gives ''beneficiaries a choice of at least two drug plans that will cover a comprehensive set of both brand name and generic drugs. '' 3,4 In a typical market, consumers' choices penalize providers of inadequate products. As is well known, however, the standard logic of competition does not apply to health insurance markets. Since insurers prefer to attract less costly patients, each insurer has an incentive to offer less generous coverage than its competitors (at a lower price). In some situations, this can create a ''race to the bottom'' in which a competitive insurance market fails to offer any insurance product providing meaningful coverage. An unsubsidized market for stand-alone prescription drug insurance is unlikely to be viable due to the severity of this problem (Pauly and Zeng 2004) . Indeed, private markets have failed to provide meaningful stand-alone prescription drug coverage for seniors. 5 Three important features distinguish the Medicare drug benefit from private provision of drug coverage. These differences are essential for creating a viable market for prescription drug coverage. First, any formulary must meet a set of minimum standards as mandated in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) and enforced by CMS. Thus, a race to the bottom would not lead to wholesale failure of the benefit, but simply to all PDPs offering the minimum formulary allowed by law. Second, the benefit is generously subsidized. 6 Medicare pays 74.5% of total plan premiums plus 80% of all catastrophic costs. (Fifteen percent of catastrophic costs are covered by PDPs, while seniors pay the remaining 5% out of pocket. In 2006, catastrophic costs were defined as annual drug costs exceeding $5,100.) Overall, the cost of the benefit to the federal government in 2006 was about $39 billion. 7 Third, and perhaps most importantly, the premium subsidy that Medicare pays to PDP providers is ''risk-adjusted.'' This is not a paper about the various transitional challenges that will loom large during the benefit's first years. Rather, our goal is to identify novel structural problems that we believe will create perverse incentives that will put long-term upward pressure on drug prices and downward pressure on drug plan quality. Unfortunately, the initial plans and prices offered during these early years are of little use for predicting long-term trends. The wide dispersion of prices may simply be due to plans' initial uncertainty about the extent of competition and about seniors' demand for drugs at subsidized prices. 8 Similarly, one might expect prices to rise in the future if seniors face significant switching costs when changing plans. 9
Risk Adjustment for Prescription Drugs: A Double-Edged Sword
Risk adjustment for comprehensive health insurance is used widely in the public sector. It is also utilized by some employers who offer their employees a choice of health insurance options. 10 Each health insurance plan's payment for providing coverage is adjusted up or down based on the expected cost of the patients who choose its plan. This dampens plans' incentive to discriminate against more costly patients, reducing the likelihood of a race to the bottom. As noted by McClellan, Spatz, and Carney (2000) , ''risk adjustment is burdensome but is an essential part of implementing a drug benefit.'' CMS uses a conventional approach for risk adjustment in which each senior's expected next-year drug spending is predicted on the basis of such observable characteristics as age, sex, new or continuing status in the program, and past medical diagnoses. The subsidy that a PDP provider receives for each senior then is adjusted up or down to reflect how that senior's expected total cost differs from the average.
Risk adjustment for stand-alone prescription drug coverage has received very little attention. This would be a small concern if the lessons learned from comprehensive health insurance applied to prescription drug coverage. But unfortunately, risk adjustment in the context of stand-alone prescription drug coverage is a far less robust tool for discouraging discrimination than in the context of comprehensive health insurance. This is due to two unique features of prescription drugs. First, pharmaceutical companies with drugs still on patent are protected from competition, and hence may act as monopolists. In contrast, providers of other medical services are rarely monopolists. Second, PDP providers have far more precise tools than health insurers for discouraging targeted groups of patients from enrolling in their plans.
Fine Risk Adjustment
Depending on the coarseness of CMS' medical diagnosis categories, seniors having different medical conditions may or may not be lumped together for risk adjustment. 11 In the context of traditional health insurance, more finely defined patient categories tend to be better, since one then can better estimate expected future costs (Glazer and McGuire 2000) and reduce insurers' incentive to discriminate against any particular group of patients by providing more accurate risk adjustments.
In the context of prescription drug coverage, on the other hand, finer risk adjustment can have the downside of causing less aggressive price competition among drug manufacturers. As an extreme case to illustrate this point, suppose that drug-level pharmacy claims data were used. This may appear sensible, since past drug usage can be used to predict future drug usage for chronic conditions. 12 Yet using such information for risk-adjustment purposes would create a costreimbursement system with tremendously perverse incentives for both PDPs and drug manufacturers.
Consider the clinically similar class of drugs known as proton pump inhibitors. One might expect that PDP providers would force manufacturers of drugs in this class to compete aggressively on price, since PDPs can threaten to steer patients toward the cheapest drug in the class. However, if druglevel pharmacy claims data were used for risk adjustment, drug manufacturers would have very little incentive to compete on price. To see why, suppose that AstraZeneca were to charge more for its proton pump inhibitor, Nexium. The risk-adjustment formula then would predict that any senior taking Nexium would be more costly than before, and each PDP provider would receive a larger subsidy from Medicare for such seniors. Consequently, PDPs would have little incentive to drop Nexium or otherwise encourage seniors to switch to a less expensive substitute.
Coarse Risk Adjustment
Medicare avoids this sort of problem by using medical diagnoses to determine each senior's risk adjustment, regardless of which drugs that senior may have taken to treat his medical conditions. Diagnosis-based risk adjustment promotes price competition among drug manufacturers as long as the drugs used to treat seniors with a given diagnosis are close substitutes. In this case, PDP providers have an incentive to drop from their formularies all but the cheapest drugs that can treat each given medical condition, which in turn induces drug manufacturers within each therapeutic class to compete more aggressively on price. On the other hand, for diagnoses that are closely associated with unique drugs, diagnosisbased risk adjustment becomes equivalent to pharmacy claims-based risk adjustment, and drug manufacturers again have little incentive to compete on price.
Diagnosis-based risk adjustment also can lead to a perverse incentive for PDPs to discriminate when a given diagnosis code is associated with several drugs that are not close substitutes. 13 In that case, risk adjustment based on the average cost of patients with this diagnosis would be too generous for patients who take the cheapest drugs and inadequate for patients who need the most costly drugs. As a result, all PDP providers would have an incentive to discourage seniors who need the most costly drugs from joining their plans. Making matters worse, PDP providers have an enormous array of instruments at their disposal to make their plans less attractive to highly targeted groups of seniors. To discourage seniors who want a particular drug from subscribing, a PDP provider only needs to move that drug onto a different tier, add it to a pre-approval list, and/or tighten its approval process.
CMS' current approach for dealing with this problem is to impose a high ''lowest bar'' for plans. In this way, CMS can limit the extent to which discriminatory practices can harm groups of seniors with certain pre-existing conditions. ''The minimum statutory requirement is that a formulary must include at least two drugs in each approved category and class.'' 14 Indeed, according to CMS formulary guidelines, much more than the statutory minimum may be required of plans: CMS may insist on inclusion of drugs that ''present unique and important therapeutic advantages'' and/or those that are ''most commonly used by the Medicare population.''
A variety of checks also will seek ''to avoid drug selection and cost-sharing that discriminate against specific disease groups.'' In its formulary guidelines, CMS explains that it identifies discriminatory plans by first searching for ''outliers.'' If all plans seek to provide poor quality to the same patients because of coarse risk adjustment, no plan will be an outlier. For this reason, it is unclear how CMS will be able to detect or correct systematic discrimination against certain groups of patients.
One way to reduce the need for close regulatory oversight is to modify the design of the benefit. For instance, we shall argue that eliminating price competition among PDPs (by fixing premiums) may strengthen quality competition among PDPs, thus reducing the need for regulation. A more radical approach is advocated by Huskamp et al. (2000) , who propose eliminating consumer choice. Under their system, a single PDP would be awarded a contract for each region. This proposal has a number of advantages relative to the current design of the Medicare drug benefit. In particular, adverse selection disappears when there is just one PDP per region, formulary compliance is likely to be high, and seniors will not have to agonize over a complex decision.
Advantages of a Drug Benefit with a Fixed Subsidy and Premium
Seniors face an important trade-off when selecting a prescription drug plan since plans can vary in both price and formulary extensiveness. By offering seniors such choice, Congress intended to create a self-regulating system in which seniors themselves determine the size and quality of the benefit via their participation in a market. However, an unintended drawback of this design is that PDP providers may have more incentive to discriminate against seniors with high expected drug costs. As already discussed, any sensible risk-adjustment approach will be imperfect in that some seniors will be more profitable to PDP providers than others. If healthier seniors are more profitable (as one might expect), all plans will have an incentive to offer less generous formularies at lower total premiums, regardless of the subsidy scheme.
Indeed, given that subsidies are set at 74.5% of the national average total premium, a race to the bottom in which all plans offer the minimum formulary allowed by law becomes more likely. To see the point most starkly, suppose that all plans want to attract ''good risks'' (the very healthiest seniors) who are likely to choose the cheapest plan. Each PDP provider will attempt to offer a plan whose total premium equals 74.5% of the national average, with a correspondingly less generous formulary, so that enrolling seniors pay nothing. If every plan attempts to be cheaper and less comprehensive than the average plan, the only possible stable outcome is for all plans to offer the minimal coverage allowed by law. 15 Seniors will have little meaningful choice if plans cluster at the minimal legal coverage. In this case, the quality and cost of the benefit effectively will be dictated by CMS regulators through their implementation of a minimum standard. PDPs also may be motivated to include on their formularies the cheapest drugs that meet the legal requirement, which need not be the most cost-effective. For instance, consider a hypothetical example in which PDPs are required to cover at least two of three drugs, each of which has no therapeutic substitutes and treats a different chronic condition. Suppose that these drugs increase life expectancy by three months, six months, and one year, and cost $10,000, $15,000, and $20,000, respectively, but they are lumped together for risk-adjustment purposes. Seniors with no pre-existing conditions would prefer a plan covering the most expensive drugs, since these are the most costeffective in terms of extending life. However, since these drugs treat chronic conditions, plans that cover the most expensive drugs will suffer from an adverse selection. For example, they will pay $20,000 per senior with the third condition but receive a risk adjustment for that senior based on the average cost of all seniors having any of the three conditions, which will be strictly less than $20,000. For this reason, all plans will have an incentive to exclude the most expensive drug in spite of the fact that it is the most cost-effective.
We argue that the market might be more capable of delivering a benefit of reasonable quality at an affordable price if drug plans were allowed to compete on quality, but not on price. More precisely, we consider an alternative to the current financing design. Under the current design, the average beneficiary premium is 25.5% of the average total premium. Now consider an alternative in which Medicare's subsidy is fixed at the amount budgeted by Congress and each beneficiary pays 25.5% of the total premium received by plans. Plans still would be allowed to compete by offering different formularies, different pharmacy networks, and so on, and seniors still would have the ability to choose among plans.
This relatively minor change in the way that the benefit is financed would change the way that the benefit functions significantly. The crucial difference is that the total cost of the benefit in this alternative would be determined ahead of time based on the amount budgeted by Congress. Under the current design, the total cost of the benefit is determined indirectly by regulators when they set minimum formulary requirements, and by the price-setting decisions of pharmaceutical companies. Fixing premiums might reduce the diversity of PDPs on quality dimensions, but it would have the obvious advantage of ensuring that the cost of the benefit was predictable.
Less obvious but no less important is that fixing premiums could reduce the need to regulate formularies and decrease the upward pressure on drug prices. Since seniors would pay the same premium regardless of which plan they chose, any plan that offered a less generous formulary would become less attractive to all seniors, not just to those who were less healthy or more affluent. To attract seniors, all PDPs would aim to assemble the most generous formulary possible within their fixed budgets. This would promote price competition among drugs, within and across therapeutic classes. PDPs having a limited budget would include only the most costeffective drugs, so pharmaceutical companies would have to price aggressively enough to ensure that their drugs were not excluded. Indeed, competition among plans could put upward rather than downward pressure on the quality of the benefit. For this reason, fixing the subsidy and beneficiary premium could have the extra advantage of decreasing the extent to which CMS would need to regulate the benefit.
Of course, if the funds provided by Congress were insufficient to cover all useful drugs, some drugs that are less cost-effective would not be covered. Yet this is inevitable under the current benefit design as well. Indeed, as we have discussed, under the current system plans may have an incentive to exclude some drugs that are more costeffective. A system with fixed premiums also might be vulnerable to political meddling, since PDPs and pharmaceutical companies would have an incentive to lobby Congress to increase the budget. Under the current system, however, these interest groups have an incentive not only to lobby Congress, but also to influence how CMS regulators implement the benefit.
A potential drawback to setting the same premium for all seniors is that the quality of the benefit might vary regionally. However, it is unclear whether our proposal or the status quo would lead to greater regional inequity. Unlike many other health care services, most drugs are not produced locally; hence production costs do not vary by region. Indeed, if resale across regions were seamless, the price of drugs would be the same in all regions. In this case, our proposal of setting the same subsidy in all regions would ensure equity, while the current system of setting each regional subsidy equal to 74.5% of the average total premium in that region would lead to inequity. For example, if seniors in wealthier areas were to demand more drugs, wealthier seniors would receive a larger subsidy.
Regulating a Stand-Alone Drug Benefit
To anticipate where and why CMS may have to play an active regulatory role, it is useful to classify restrictions on PDP behavior into ''bright-line'' versus ''fuzzy-line'' rules, and ''binding'' versus ''non-binding'' rules. A bright-line rule provides a clear test for determining prohibited conduct. For instance, the requirement that ''a formulary must include at least two drugs in each approved category and class'' is a bright-line rule. On the other hand, the requirement that all drugs presenting ''unique and important therapeutic advantages'' be included is a fuzzy-line rule. Enforcing bright-line rules requires minimum regulatory oversight, while verifying compliance with fuzzy-line rules requires interpretation and discretion.
A fuzzy-line rule is binding if most participants have an incentive to violate it and/or negotiate its interpretation with CMS; otherwise, it is non-binding. PDPs facing binding fuzzy-line rules will push the envelope as far as they can, and enforcing such rules may turn CMS into a heavy-handed regulator. To understand how CMS is likely to regulate the benefit, it is important to consider which fuzzy-line rules are likely to be binding.
The requirement that PDPs must include ''drugs most commonly used by the Medicare population'' might seem straightforward, but it is a fuzzy-line rule since CMS likely exercises discretion when applying it. For instance, Nexium is one of the most frequently used medications. Does this mean that Nexium must be included on every Medicare formulary? Probably not, since Nexium does not provide ''unique and important therapeutic advantages,'' the other fuzzy-line rule for drug inclusion on formularies. (Prilosec is virtually clinically indistinguishable from Nexium and likely to be available in generic form.) As discussed in the introduction, these rules already may have been binding on those offering coverage for 2006, as CMS officials insisted on more extensive formularies. Unfortunately, by setting minimum requirements for a particular therapeutic class, CMS increases the upward pressure on the prices of drugs in that class.
Perhaps the most important binding fuzzyline rule is the requirement that formularies should not discriminate against specific groups of patients. ''Nondiscrimination'' in this context is far from being an innocuous platitude. Excluding a drug or setting a high copay discriminates against patients whose doctors prescribe this drug; however, Congress did not intend to require that all drugs be covered by all plans. In fact, Congress required plans to use best private-market practices to control costs. Consequently, some amount of ''discrimination'' is necessary.
Broadly speaking, Congress' intent appears to be that people with a particular disease or condition should not be put in a position where the drugs that they need are not covered. Still, it is unclear where to draw the line. For instance, recent research suggests that metastatic colorectal cancer may be treated most effectively by a combination of Avastin, Eloxatin, and Xeloda, three of the very few drugs approved to treat this disease. 16 Avastin alone costs about $50,000 for one year's supply and, on average, prolongs life by several months. Does refusal to cover Avastin constitute illegal discrimination against colon cancer patients for whom this drug (perhaps in combination with others) is their best hope? When PDPs submitted their formularies, the answer to this question was not clear to all plans. Afterward, CMS clarified its requirement, insisting that all formularies include ''all or substantially all'' anticancer drugs.
Once all formularies are required to carry a particular drug, we can expect the price of that drug to explode. Indeed, as argued by Newhouse (2004) , the fact that beneficiaries only pay a fraction c of the cost means that drug manufacturers' profit-maximizing prices will be 1/c times as high. For drugs associated with catastrophic spending, c 5 5%, so this effect would predict prices 20 times as high.
We expect the nondiscrimination requirement to remain binding in the future. Indeed, as discussed earlier, unique features of standalone prescription drug coverage suggest that any sensible risk adjustment mechanism will give PDP providers the incentive to favor certain groups of patients and not others.
Other potentially binding fuzzy-line rules relate to the auditing of plans' cost projections by CMS. In commercial audits, a financially healthy business typically has little incentive to game auditors, since the outcome of the audit has no direct impact on its bottom line. In contrast, CMS audits plans' cost projections for the purpose of ''risksharing.'' Medicare pays up to 80% of any difference if these projections are wrong, so biased projections could have a real and significant impact on a PDP's bottom line and on government liabilities. Deciding on permissible methods for producing cost projections may prove to be a binding fuzzy-line rule since anticipating patients' needs is notoriously difficult.
Yet another potentially binding fuzzy-line rule related to auditing is that each PDP's formulary must result in an average beneficiary copayment of 25% for seniors with cumulative annual costs in the relevant range. 17 Predicting patients' responses to formulary incentives is critical for estimating the average copayment. Yet understanding the impact of formulary structure on patients' choices is on the frontier of academic research (Goldman et al. 2004; Huskamp et al. 2003) . There is no standard or generally accepted approach for producing such estimates.
The law makes it relatively easy for PDP providers to drop drugs from their formularies or change copayments. 18 While beneficiaries can change plans only once a year, a PDP provider can drop a drug from its formulary any time after giving 30 days' notice to subscribers. This rule might appear dangerously one-sided, but it is not unusual in commercial insurance markets. 19 The ability of PDPs to change prices after seniors commit to a plan already has become a concern for legislators. During the open enrollment period, seniors can consult the Web-based ''Medicare Plan Finder'' to learn more about plans. After people enter all of their prescription information, the site provides an estimate of their annual out-ofpocket costs for every drug plan available in their state. These estimates are not binding. Consequently, seniors who are locked into a plan for a year may end up incurring far greater out-of-pocket costs than the quote given by their PDP.
This possibility led Sen. Richard Durbin of Illinois to propose a Truth in Pricing Act that will require PDPs to stick with their original price estimates (unless the price declines). In a Nov. 29, 2005, letter to congressional colleagues, Durbin illustrated the need for this law by citing the experience of a constituent who takes Arthrotec, Fosamax, K-Tabs, Lasix, Prevacid, and Trental: ''The Medicare Plan Finder on November 17, 2005, offered a list of appropriate prescription drug plans, including Medicare Rx Rewards Premier, which had an estimated annual cost of $2,691.69. My staff re-checked the same drug list on the Plan Finder less than a week later, on November 22, 2005, and found the same plan was then estimated to have an annual cost of $3,844.49, an increase of $1,152.80 from a week before.'' Such problems may be due, at least in part, to ''start-up issues'' beyond the scope of this paper. Yet the perverse incentives that we have identified here will not go away in the future. Drug makers will tend to respond to their incentives to increase the price of drugs that must be covered, and PDP providers will tend to seek out ways in which they can profitably push the regulatory envelope. One is left with a system that, we believe, will require continuous and intense long-term regulatory oversight of PDP providers.
Conclusion
Where private insurance markets have failed, Medicare may succeed in providing meaningful and sustainable stand-alone prescription drug coverage. Three key features of the Medicare benefit make this possible: the Medicare benefit is subsidized, the premiums that drug plans receive are ''risk adjusted,'' and CMS can impose mandatory minimal quality standards.
Both the subsidy and risk adjustment are intended to create a self-regulating market, in which the size and quality of the benefit are determined by seniors via their participation in a market. However, our analysis suggests that CMS regulation ultimately will determine the cost and comprehensiveness of the benefit through its implementation of a minimum standard. Perverse incentives for PDP providers also arise from the fact that Medicare's premium subsidy is computed as a percentage of the average total premium. As an alternative, we argue that fixing the subsidy at the amount budgeted by Congress (while allowing plans to compete on quality) would decrease budgetary uncertainty, could reduce upward price pressure on drug costs, and could diminish somewhat the need for CMS to play an active regulatory role.
Issues with risk adjustment are more fundamental and unavoidable. Risk adjustment is intended to avert a ''race to the bottom'' and discrimination against particular groups of patients. It has proved modestly successful in accomplishing just that in the market for health insurance. Due to unique features of stand-alone drug coverage, however, PDP providers' incentives to discriminate against patients with certain pre-existing conditions cannot be eliminated without creating other serious problems. In particular, PDP providers will have an incentive to discriminate against some groups of patients unless CMS can sufficiently fine-tune its riskadjustment formula. Yet pharmaceutical companies' incentives to raise prices become stronger as risk adjustment occurs over finer and finer scales.
In the end, implementation of the benefit will require active regulatory involvement that controls drug prices and/or controls PDP formularies and plan practices. Understandably, CMS has had to take an active regulatory role during the benefit's wellpublicized ''birth pains.'' Our analysis suggests that CMS will have to continue to closely regulate the benefit, especially in the area of formulary design, for the foreseeable future. 20 Yet any minimum standard that CMS imposes on formularies will put additional upward pressure on drug prices. Ultimately, this could jeopardize the drug benefit's budgetary viability.
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